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A Review of von Weizsacker's

Am Anfang
By

AUGUST C. R.EHWALDT

the winter of 1919/20 Victor von Weizsiicker 1 de] ) livered a series of lectures on natural philosophy at the
University of Heidelberg. Because of conditions of war
only a fragment of these lectures has been preserved. This was
published under the title: A1n Anfang sch11/ Goll Himmel tmd
ErJ,.~ The opening sentences of the lecture proper are: "We begin
by referring to a particular historical document, the oldest, perhaps,
in existence, the creation account of the Bible. \Ve shall see that
it contains all the most important problems of natural philosophy."
This paper is an attempt to share some of \Veizsiicker's thoughts.
URING

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

'Toe attempt t0 formulate a natural philosophy bas as its basis
the desire to know whnt 11at11r
e as a hole
•iu
re11ll1 is and what our
relation tO it is. We can now say that at the end of our discussion
we shall not know this; in fact, we can predict this with a great
deal of certainty. So we ought to tell ourselves, as we begin: I know
that everything I can say of nature will be less true, less great, and
less perfect than nature itself."
Wcizsiicker states clearly the direction his discussion is to take,
particularly in relation to epistemology (Erlumntni.s1h,ori,, as the
Germans call it). For six or seven decades previous to 1929 German philosophy concerned itself, for the most part, with the extension of Kant's Erk111n1nis1heorie. As a result, the philosophy (German) of this period was largely theory of cognition and never
questioned the content of such experimental sciences as chemistry
and physics, but instead concerned itself only with the form into
which these sciences had been cast. It did no more than attempt
to establish the logical assumptions on which the sciences were
1 Viktor von Weizsiicker:
scientist,
1ese:arch
neurologist, practicing physician, lecturer, and philosopher. Died 1957. Gr:andson of Karl Heinrich von
\Veizsicker, the cheologian. After coming out of World War I, he expressed
the hope dw the world would finally turn to Christianity and realize ir in all
area, also in the natural sciences.
1 4th ed. (Gorringen: Vaadenhoeck le Ruprecht, 1957). 108 pages.
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established and maintained their position. Their content was for
philosophy a 110U-me-ta11,gere. Thus philosophy yielded her ancient
prerogative of being the 1cien#11, with the right to view the world
as a whole by her own methods and processes. It has placed the
experience of the sciences on a throne that stands higher than the
chair of the philosopher. This runs counter t0 the ptimary claim
of philosophy to be the comprehensive knowledge. If some sort
of natuml philosophy is to be formulated, it will not do simply
t0 affirm the truth of the experimental sciences. The natural
sciences must be critically weighed, not only in a formal way but
also as tO content. We must be concerned about the claims of
science. In fact, this is our first considemtion. The question which
interests us above all else is whether modern scientific knowledge
is the only way tO penetmte the inner regions of nature. It may
be that there are points of view altogether different which will
let us look behind the scenes. So the problem resolves itself int0
this: Is there a philosophic knowledge of nature? \Ve recognize
that this is a long-debated question, but we shall leave it at that.
Perhaps it is more desirable under the circumstances "to start hares
than to catch them," to quote the late Dean Gauss of Princeton.
0DJECl"IVlTY AND SCIENTIFIC TRUTH

It seems advisable to digress at this point and to leave Weizsacker for the time being, for the one or the other may think that
science is so solidly established, and is so objective, that no criticism
is possible.
A very lucid analysis of modern science can be gleaned from
the first fifty pages of Thure von Uexkiill's Der Me11sch 11ml, die
N111,w.8 He points out some of the transformations of natural
sciences during the past fifty years. Truth ( this does not include
revealed truth so far as this discussion is concerned) was once defined as being agreement between concept or perception and object
or thing. This definition dates back t0 the Scholastics. An insurmountable difficulty appears with this definition. Each science
paints its own picture of nature and reality. Which is to be the
standard of comparison?
It was Francis Bacon who replaced this Scholastic definition of
I Bera: Praake Verlag,

1953.
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uurh with a new one. This new definition hns been the unshaken
foundation of science up to the present time. It was on this that
modern science was founded and could develop into what it is

today.
Bacon postulated that no knowledge exists which is not dependent on an ability to perform (to do), and conversely, there is no
methodical performance which does not proceed from knowledge.
Knowledge and ability are concepts which have no significance for
&con unless they are conversely related to each other: q11a,1'11111,
seim11s 11111111m poss1111111s, "the reach of our knowledge determines
the reach of our ability," was his famous thesis. In this Sputnik
age it is hardly necessary to mention the degree to which our ability
to do has been extended by our scientific knowledge. But the con\'ctse is also ttue: q11a,1ttm1, poss11111,11s la1ll1'11J scim11s, "only as far
as our ability reaches, does our knowledge reach." Beyond our
abiliry tO do we can only set up uncertain conjectures which we
cm prove neither true nor false. Conjectures which we cannot
put tO the test through our abilities are unproductive for natural
science. So here we see that the thesis of Bacon, put in this form,
can tell us some essential things about natural sciences which man
invented; for it delimits in bold strokes the framework within
which man is confined with his inventive pcwers.
To show this we shall consider brie8y how a scientific investigation proceeds. It functions about as follows: We assume there
is some problem. First, presuppositions are invented, working
hypotheses from which the searching and questioning of the phenomenon proceeds. But these working hypctheses are applicable
only if they make assertions which concern themselves with something we can do, something lying within our practical capacity.
If, for example, we say that two bodies cannot occupy the same
space at the same time, we have a working hypcthesis which concerns itself with the way in which we handle objects in space nod
time. This hypcthesis delimits the space in which we can move
and operate, inasmuch as it maintains that two objects cannot
occupy the same space and that we cannot move them into the
same space at the same time. If we begin with this assumption,
we have at first no more than hypcthctical truth ( this is ttuc
providal ••. ) on the basis of which the phenomena are interpreted.
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1958
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We assume that the phenomena comply with the conditions of our
hypothesis and adjust our attitude accordingly. If later it becomes
apparent that our hypothesis is valid in case after case, it will evenrually be ranked as a scientific axiom or principle. A brief review
of the physics of gases and fluids will demonstrate sufficiently to
what extent such an axiom concerning the na111re of matter in space
determines our scientific interpretation, our methods, and so our
picture of narure.
It may, of course, happen that axioms which have been valid
for centuries while investigations of certain phenomena were extended more and more, suddenly fail if the interpretation is pushed
toO far. Modern physics itself is an enlightening example of this
( quanrum theory; theory of relativity). This shows that axioms
which were considered to be philosophical necessities (De11knotwendigkei1e,1-) fare no better in science than any other axioms.
As soon as they fail, science must devise new working hypotheses,
and it must determine whether these can so interpret the phenomena that we can handle them and work better with them than
we could with the former axioms. If a new hypothesis meets all
the requirements, it will evenrually be ranked as an axiom. This
means that a new axiom has appeared, and since scientific axioms
are to interpret phenomena of nature, new ideas and concepts will
arise with them. But since we know nature only in terms of our
scientific concept, this can only mean that in the end nature changes
as the axioms change on which the interpretations are based.
The consequence is that the truth of scientific knowledge is determined neither by the axioms with which we begin nor by the
object which we sought to grasp and understand by means of these
axioms, but the criterion is whether our axioms are valid or faulty.
Hence, in contrast to the Scholastic thesis, we do not establish truth
by the criterion of agreement between concept and object, but the
only criterion which can establish the truth and reality of the object
is the failure or the validity of the axioms with which we operate.
At this point we can obtain a fuller understanding of the nature
of a scientific experiment. This is very pertinent at this point. The
authority of science rests largely on the scientific experiment. The
experiment proceeds strictly from the known to the unknown. It
attempts to interpret new phenomena on the basis of known
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol29/iss1/33
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axioms, so that we can operate with, or use, or handle the phenomena. At the same time, however, whenever an axiom is applied
thus, we are testing the axiom, i.e., the extent of its validity. Therefore, to experiment actually involves two things: first, we experiment with phenomena on the basis of our knowledge; secondly,
we teSt or try our knowledge with the phenomena. The experiment shows man the framework or the boundaries within which
he is confined with his inventions; it also shows man that he may
not formulate any number and variety of hypotheses; thus it shows
man the limits within which his inventions are valid. This is, in
part, Uexkiill's analysis of scientific truth and method. This shows
bow we arrive at something which we call truth but still does not
answer the question: What is truth?
Meanwhile the objectivity of science has all but disappeared.
The awe with which the popular mind approaches science is overdone. Such an analysis also makes it apparent that science does
not so much make assertions concerning nature itself but rather
concerns itself with the way in which the searching intellect views
nature. We turn again to Weizsacker.
GENESIS

1:1-8

In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And
the earth was without form and void; and darkness was upon the

face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of
the w:aters.
And God said: Let there be light, and there was light.
And God saw the light that it was good, and God divided the
light from the darkness. And God called the light day, and the
darkness He called night. And the evening and the morning were
the first day.
And God said: Let there be a firmament in the midst of the
waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters.
And God made the firmament and divided the waters which
were under the firmament from the waters which were above the
firmament; and it was so.
And God called the firmament heaven. And the evening and
the morning were the second day.
We are justified in designating Genesis 1 as natural philosophy,
not so much because sun and moon, plants and animals, are mentioned but rather because the whole of nature is contrasted with
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something which is not nature, namely, God. God and nature are
distinguished. There is something which is not nature and yet
stands in an intimate relation to every member of nature. In fact,
nature is explained through this relation. Such an explanation is
natural philosophy.
"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." This
is the ultimate that can be asserted of nature. "The moment the
first sentence of this far-reaching and momentous thought is put
into words it is no longer a certainty but a problem. Anything
recorded, th.'lt is, expressed in words, represents knowledge, which
is subject to questioning, which is problematic. Ever since, human
thinking has been filled with doubt and has contended over this
first sentence." ,. \Vith these words of Genesis 1 the line of battle
is drawn in the age-old conflict between the theology of the Bible
and natural science, between religion· and reason, between faith
and knowledge. One thing this theological or thcocosmic world
view and modern science have in common - the original question:
Whence is this world? \Vhere is it going? How does it exist?
Both inquire about origin to satisfy nn inherent need for explanation and knowledge. The next question would naturally be: What
does creation really mean?

Co11cep1s of Create
We refer to Genesis 1 as the creation account. It is that indeed,
but the author by no means presents the activity of God uniformly
through the idea of creation. Instead it is described by a wealth of
meaningful verbs. We can distinguish rwo groups of activities.
In the one, God remains with Himself; the activity pertains to
Himself, reflects upon Himself. In the other, God reaches beyond
Himself. The activity is away from God. It is directed toward the
world and is exerted upon the world. The first group would include
such acts as His inspection of creation and seeing that "it was
good." The other would include the acts of creation as such. These
are designated by the words "God created, God said, God divided."
At the very first, the loftiest and the all-inclusive idea of bring• Ir is to be undentoocl thar all quorarions are from Weizsicker unless otherwise indicated. Translations and parentheses are by the writer of this article.
Permission ro prinr rhese translated passages has been granted by the publishers.
The crM thanks rhem for their kindness.
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ing forth is asserted with the words "God aeated." We shall consider this as it is here isolated and stands all alone in verse one.
"Here we are not told how God created. We know neither which
divine attribute empowered Him to be Creator nor how He goes
about the activity of creating. Nothing is said about motives or
means or ways. Nor do we know whether we should ever think of
Him as non-Creator. We hear only: 'In the beginning God
aeated..'"
Verse 2 brings the first explanatory matter: "The Spirit of God
moved upon the face of the deep." The text says, ''The Spirit of
God." This is the introduction, or the presupposition for the first
aeation about to begin, that God acts as a spirit. It is the presupposidon for all creation, not only for these first creations mentioned here in Genesis 1, but also for the ultimate creation, the
human nature of the Logos. According to Luke 1:35, the angel
announces the birth of Jesus to Mary by saying: ''The Holy Ghost
shall come upon thee and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee. . . ." The concept of the Spirit moving over the
face of the primordial water is that of hovering or quivering.
It introduces the creative act as an activity of the Spirit.0 This
becomes clear as the first creation emerges. "And God said: Let
there be light, and there was light." God creates by speaking.
Through speaking, through the Word, through a command, He
becomes Creator. The creative act is a creating and commanding
by the Spirit.

Stms11al Perception a Presttpposition
We leave our author to add that John sees it all clearly. "Jn the

beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the
Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All
things were made by [through] Him; and without Him was not
anything made that was made" (John 1: 1-3). All things of this
temporal creation have their origin in the Eternal. Their temporal
existence we call reality, that is, they have an existence which we
can apprehend through our senses. We are well aware of the fact
that this last statement is open to challenge, but we shall let it
stand. These realities stand in a dual relation. On the one hand,
I

0. Ps, 33:6; 104:30.
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they exist in the frame of temporal and earthly events and so
become members of a chain of events we call cause and effect; on
the other hand, they are dependent on God's word of power in
every moment of their existence.
If we were to review everything that some time or other has
been said about reality, objectivity, and subjectivity, we would find,
in the erid, that the manifold phenomena, such as heat and cold,
color, sound, time and space, have all been called illusions, evoked
by the activity of our senses. Everything would be going in circles,
and be turned end tO end, and finally we would be at a loss what
tO believe. And when all is said and done, we would nevertheless
return to the familiar point of view and insist: what we observe
we know. If I observe that this desk supports my paper, then
I know that it does. If I observe that the desk has collapsed, I know
this also. All this may sound elementary, and it has neither proved
nor disproved anything. But it is scientific. We may be quite confident about this. Genesis 1 takes for granted that anyone who
reads the account can apprehend with the senses the realities of
which it speaks.

Ori.gin of A11tithescs
We shall lee Weizsacker continue. The third mode of creation
is presented next: "God divided." This is not mentioned in connection with the first creative ace, for the creation of light was
absolute, without any secondary effect. This dividing or cleaving
or separating is not an essential element of the process of bringing
int0 existence. Nevertheless it is of fundamental significance, for
it makes the first reference to that which creation produced, the
creature. The concept of dividing does not re.Beet upon the Creator,
but the action is away from God and is directed toward the world.
It does not enlighten us concerning the essence of God, the Creator,
but it reveals something of the nature of the creature. This dividing is repeated on each succeeding day of creation. Each day's work
produces two things in contrast with each other. At this point we
might well be reminded of the fact that the Oriental religions quite
generally present the dual principle as being primary, or original,
and that the theology of the Bible overcomes this dualism by presenting it as being this-sided, temporal, and that it appears after
having been created by God.
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol29/iss1/33
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In contrast to all intmmundane events, which arc conditional,
dependent, and relative, creation is unconditional, independent, and
absolute. These are all negative assertions and cannot convey anything really positive. Now we arc told that divine creation is not
only a bringing forth, but it is also a dividing. With a cleaving
gesture the Creator reaches into the chaotic world. He createS.
He cleaves. He divides that which was a one into a two. He divides
the light from the darkness; He divides the water from tbe water,
that which is above from that which is below; He divides the dry
Jand from the water. Thus our world comes into being, becomes
a world of contrasts, of polarities and antitheses, a world of opposites. This antithesis, or being opposite, is a fundamental phenomenon in our world. We see it everywhere, especially in what
we call nature. No maner in which direction scientific research
pnneds or how far it goes, nlways :it the end stands a polnrity.
In the final analysis the constitution of matter resolves itself into
opposing forces. The atom is an aggregate of opposite chnrges.
What is life but the struggle with death, and knowledge but a disringuishing between that which is true nnd that which is false?
Our world is in fact a world of opposites because ( as the creation
account says) "He divided." To put it into philosophical Janguage,
we have discovered the problem of negation as a primordial phenomenon of science and so of nature, and as a primordial phenomenon of nature and so of science.
For the time being we shall not consider the implications of this
principle of polarity. It will force itself upon us persistently as we
continue. Instead, we shall let Weizsiicker summarize directly the
fundamental concepts of natural philosophy which have emerged
from the account so far. (P. 14 f.)

P1nulament11l Concepts
The first and principal concept is that of creation. This is, as
it were, the egg from which all else must develop. It is the fundamental of all our knowledge. Ir assens that the world is what it
is, nor of itself bur of God. As now becomes apparent, it is nor
correct to distinguish between God and the world as we did earlier.
God alone divides as He proceeds with His work of creation.
Distinctlons, i.e., negative and positive predications, CUl be made
with .respect co the creature, but not with respect to the Creator
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Himself. He is without any negativism. He Himself, the Author
of all distinctions, cannot be subject to distinction. This is essentially the idea of God on which all occidental science is based.
It is impossible to understand this science fully unless there has
been acceptance of the thought, or rebellion [Lucifer's] against
the thought, that there is a Creator God. The magnitude and the
consequence of this confiict is, after all, the magnitude and the
consequence of this occidental science.
Inseparable from this fundamental idea is the more specific
designation of the creative act as a creation of the Spirit through
the Word, through the command: "Let there be." The manner
in which the creative act follows is very decisive for the course
which natural science takes. There is a fundamental difference
between the act of creation and the inuamundane events of nature.
The aa of creation creates a natural process but is itself not
a natural process. Thus an e,•ent in nature takes on a peculiar
character. It is created by the Spirit but is itself not spiritual.
Nature as such is nonspiritual.
Nature as such is nonspiritual, and yet, Weizsiicker insists, it
has spirit (ist geistig), has genius. It shows this genius through all
its sublime grandeur and variety. It points to the Spirit, its
Creator. We add that this view is in accord with the Scriptures,
e.g., Ps. 148; 98; 19: 1-5, to mention just a few of the many passages which present the idea that nature has a message and a meaning; the Savior looked upon nature as being one grand parable.
But from antiquity down to the present time the world view of
many distinguished theorists of natural science in the West has
rested on the denial of the Creator God. It has robbed His nature
of its genius and has set up chance as its ruler.
GENESIS

1 :9-13

And God said: Let the waters under the heaven be gathered
together unto one place, and let the dry land appear; and it was so.
And God called the dry land earth; and the gathering together of
the waters called he seas: and God saw that it was good.
And God said: Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed
is in itself, upon the earth; and it was so. And the earth brought
forth grass and herb yielding seed after his kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after his kind; and God saw
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol29/iss1/33
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that it was good. And the evening and the morning were the
mini clay.

By the time we reach the third creation dny we begin tO wonder what the world looked like. Perhaps something should be said
about this. But should it? We shall let our author continue from
here. The realms of heaven and enrth, light o.nd darkness, exist as
yet only in a very general way, or we may say, in a vague way.
There is not the slightest suggestion in the account which might
satisfy the curiosity of him who asks: "What was the world really
like by now?" "Can anyone picrure to himself a world made up
of only light and darkness, heaven and earth, with nothing else
that '\\'Ould so much as suggest any kind of form, not even a stone
or a cloud or a star? Something had been created in principle, but
it is something which cannot be grasped by the power of the human
imagination but is cast in a form that demands superhuman powers
of abst:raetion." At this point the world was something which still
lay beyond the range of human experience. The world was still in
process of becoming. We dare not go beyond the account. The
tCXt as it stnnds binds us, and we have no warrant tO make any
kind of explanatory statement beyond that which the text makes.
We may not read present-day conditions inro the text by way of
explanation, not even intervals of time or measurement of time, in
order to determine the length of these first days.

Origi11
,
of Indi11id11a/i11
The third creative day changes all this: this is the dny of the
creation of things. Moreover, these are temporal things (diesstt
itige,
sinnlicUonkrttle Di,ige), things which are concrete and within the
grasp of our senses, things which make up the nature with which
we are familiar. It is our world which takes form in response t0
divine command. The wet and the dry clements move apart; the
firm land and the seas take their places; grasses and herbs and trees
appear. Two primordial phenomena of nature make their appearance, the various clements and life, the inorganic and the organic.
Now the account has us standing in the midst of nature. Its forms
are familiar, and we are beginning t0 feel at home, for we can
grasp these things with our senses. Before Weizsacker enters int0
a consideration of the relation between the inorganic and the
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1958
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organic nature, he prefers to discuss in a general way the problem
of the origin of individuality or particularity (Beso11tl11rhn111n) of
the members of nature. This has a significant bearing on the understanding of the attitude of science toward nature, and we shall
attempt to follow him in this discussion. The question which originally arises with the chaos problem: Origin from nothing or origin
from something? forces itself upon us again with the origin of
things. These things possess qualitative differences. What is the
origin of qualitative individuality, or to put it abstractly: What is
the origin of quality? The creation account states: "God created."
& stated before, anything expressed in words becomes knowledge
and problematic. If the word "God created" is accepted in faith,
this faith will be followed by assent and approval reaching to the
ultimate consequences. Next will follow knowledge, not the problematic kind but absolute. John 6:69: "And we believe and are
sure...." I know because I believe. But aside from faith the word
"God created" will be received by natural reason immediately as
a thought, together with its antithesis, naturally, for this is a world
of opposires. Next this will be looked upon as immanent knowledge, as something problematic, as an explanation of nature. This
knowledge becomes a function. In the case at hand it becomes
science or an explanation of nature. Here are rudiments of the
modern explanation of nature. We return to Weizsacker more
directly after this paraphrase.

Scie11ce Overcomes Q1111li11
How does modern natural science explain the qualitntive variety
of the things of nature? Fundamentally in a very simple manner:
it does not explain; instead, it denies. It seeks to do away with
qualities by resolving them into quality-free, quantitative differences,
into differential equations. This needs some illustration. A modern
tendency is to eliminate the distinction between the animate and
the inanimate. The bridge between the two is the virus, which from
our present-day point of view exhibits characteristics of both the
animate and the inanimate. If life is an aggregate of mechanical
processes, if it is the outcome of the processes of chemistry and
physics, then the next step is not difficult to take: there is no distinction between the animate and the inanimate. But life is an
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol29/iss1/33
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.individualistic phenomenon. It is, after all, being self, also among
the animals. Yet the evolutionary hypothesis is based on the asswnpdon that life is one - one direct line with lateral extensions at
certain points on the line. If we pursue chis thought to the end,
we will finally arrive at modern mass psychology, mass action, mass
thinking, mass welfare, and the like. The individual has disappeared and is lost among the quantitative qualities.0 This, Weizsicker insists, is the great and historical significance of the quantitative method of natural science. It is the direct consequence, he
thinks, of eliminating God from nature, and of the denial that
nature bas spirit, or genius, to which we referred earlier.
All that gives expression to nature, that contributes to her spirit,
the realms of color, music and sound, life and beauty, meaning
and purpose, disappears with the destruction of her qualitative
multifariousness. The qualities become more and more scant,
more
and thinned out. This all happens, as though in
faded
a dream, by getting farther and farther away from the critical
starting point: sensual perception and the capacity ro experience
objects directly. TI1e world of science, of electrons and quanta,
of structural formulas and differential equations takes us ever
farther and farther away from that which can be experienced,
from that which can be perceived with the senses. Moreover,
as natural science apparently overcomes the multifarious qualities
of nature and proceeds to explain them away by means of quantitative relation, it seems to forget what it was that it set out to explain. It had set out to explain the quality of things. It simply
denies quality.•..
But to return to the starting point: reason cannot comprehend
the origin of things. Reason which struck out for itself does not
dare to confess, "God created." Instead it says, "MY knowledge
is roo limited." But this admission of the limitations of human
understanding is nothing less than a confession of the Unlimited.
The one is impossible without the other....
If objective nature cannot be apprehended as such, but only as
subjective consciousness and appearances, fundamentally, then,
every perception of objeas becomes an impossibility. Then, in
fact, none of the things exist in the mode in which the creation
• "Being in the Minority Doesn't Necessarily Mean a Man Is Daft" (ediS-111,t/111 B,,.,,;,,6 Poll, Vol. 230, No. 28 (Jan. 11, 1958). Shows an
a:ueme.

torial),
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account sees them. If the essence of knowledge is no longer
perception of object and reality, but consists in the overcoming
of multifariousness and manifold qualities, then the objective of
science is not knowledge but overcoming. This means that the
purpose of science is negation for the purpose of affirmation, aflir.
mation through negation. In this funaion of resolving and dissolving things, science is constantly aflinning the Godhead. Nature
did not create, nor did reason create. These two, not able to
create, can only negate and mediate. The fact that they can do
this and no more, that is their sole affirmation. And the fact that
they do it is their confession of the Godhead. Thus every scientific
expl:mation is a process of destroying. Ench process of desuoying
implies a denial of a this-sidedness [temporality]. And each such
denial is an affirmation of the Absolute, the Unending, the Unlimited. Here the name of God lives solely in negations. (Pages

33-35)
I11t·ranal11ral Rala1io11
All this is preliminary to a consideration of the third day of
creation. The creation of the third day is, to put it into the language of today. the inorganic and the organic nature. Our discussion will be centered in these two, for the stars and the animals
are left for a later day. We shall again confine ourselves to what
is fundamental in this duality. The fundamental feature is that
these two real~s. the inanimate and the animate, appear separately.
As was stated earlier, science would erase this distinction. In the
account they appear as separate entities. The idea of a one, which
then is divided into a two, does not appear here. The cleaving
gesture is not used, but in the creation the dry earth, seas, grass,
herbs, and trees follow one another in a simple manner, but first
comes the inorganic and then the organic. This appears so simple
and so natural to us, for the presupposition of vegetation is the
dry land. This is a condition of life for vegetation. This is very
appealing but at the same time of great significance: for here we
meet for the first time an intramundane, or intranatural relation of
something dependent on a certain necessary condition. This abstraa concept is not stated in so many words, but it appears to be
applied.nevertheless. And the manner in which it is applied throws
light on the whole creation account. What appears here for the
first time is an intranatural process which has nothing recognizably
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol29/iss1/33

14

Rehwaldt: A Review of von Weizsäcker's Am Anfang
A llVIE\V OP VON WEIZSACIOlll.'S AJlf ANPANG

485

divine about it, so that the organic nature is not created outright,
but the process which eventually produces it is divinely inaugurated.
Here we are witnessing the birth of the natural science of the
knowledge of a nature without God. . . . And u the account
proceeds. it builds up its world after the manner of natural
science chronologically, in· that the natural presuppositions precede: the inorganic- organic, the plant - animal, the animal man, and later, nature - history. A completely new principle is
added to the concept of cre:ition: the principle of naturally
necessary interdependence of things. At no time does the account
oJfer expl:ina.tion. It remains narrative throughout while at the
same time it contains the full germ or rudiment of explanation....
The fully expanded explanation of nature rendered by the
natural science of today can now be defined. We have already
m:ognized two of its essential trends. The one lies in the negativism of its thinking, and the other consists in the overcoming,
or explaining away, of the qualitative multifariousness of nature
through the application of quantitative methods ( i. e., by considering qualities exhibited by a mass of individuals rather than
by considering individual and particular qualities). Both are
closely connected. Now a third can be added. For now the peculiar direction which this process of overcoming takes can be indicated. It follows the principle of the natural interdependence
of things. To explain means essentially to trace back to conditioning factors and to resolve :ind dissipate these. Thus the fundamental ideas of caus:ility, force, and matter arise. Each phenomenon
of nature is traced back to 1011,ethi,ig other which reduces the
phenomenon under explanation to nothing. We explain life by
means of a dead mechanism, the movement of forces, and the
chemical elements by means of elecuons. As this is done, nature
is uni-formed and becomes a oneness again, a quality-free primordial substance, a chaotic confusion of atoms. Thus we a.re
again dose to chaos. In fact, this process ends where it began.

(Pp.36-37)

Ptm1heism

In concluding the discussion of the third day Weizsiiclcer asks
to the qualities which have been explained
away? Does nothing remain of the spirit and the genius of nature
to which we referred several · times before? These are the real

what has happened

problems which concern natural philosophy. If these were burning questions thirty years ago, they are even more so today. These
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problems are as old as the mechanistic explanation of nature, as
old as materialism and the exact natural sciences. Equally old are
the reactions, the countermovements, and the contradictions. We
shall hear of these rather directly.
Artistic, moral, and religious emotions revolt against the con•
sequences of the mechanistic conception of nature, no matter how
inescapable they may appear.
But one needs hardly to refer to such high-sounding words as
morality and art and religion. There is something elementary
within us that becomes ruffled. We harbor within a natural sympathy for some kind of uniformity in nature and feel that there
is something human about the things of nature. A normal man
will not be robbed of these feelings. After all, these things have
their destiny, too, even if it is only a little cloud that forms in
the blue sky on a summer day to go through fantastic shapes as it
disappears within a few minutes under the heat of the sun. But it
was there for a few moments, was a part of the great and unending nature which would not be complete without it...• So there
is hidden in each tree a dryad, and a Pan in every block of stone.
After all, the block has its own individual form and represents
the unending Jaw of nature no more and no Jess than a cell in
the cerebrum of Aristotle does. This nature is beautiful beyond
measure and is alive and powerful and violent. It creates and
forms and brings fonh and kills in greatest things as well as in
the smallest. And if anyone snid a thousand rimes it is all nothing
but a host of atoms like a swarm of gnars, we would answer just
as many thousand times that every gnat in a swarm is a wonderful
creature, full of spirit and meaning and power, that loves and
suffers and dies, it knows not how.
This, after aJJ, is what is designated with the word ,pantheism.
Ir is the frame of soul that does not say: God is spirit, bur says:
Nature has spirit, is spirit through and through. This is how the
nature mythologist feels. Everything is the very opposite of the
nature as it is conceived by natural science. This view we considered earlier. Ir does nor always see something else back of
things. Here is no negation of things. No, they are affirmed.
Each thing is what it is. The tree is a tree, not a mechanism;
man is man, nor a machine. Here nothing is reduced to mathematia, abstracted to ideas, generalized into laws, but all is viewed
as having singleness of purpose, idea, and meaning. . . •
This view of nature is heathen. While our natural science has
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol29/iss1/33
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dimiaated God from the world, here the world is deified, is
made God. It is not the individual thing that is God, but quite
the contrary... all mken together. According to this view God
is the essence of reality, the on.s re11li.ssimt1tn al gcncralisrimum.
Therefore He is as incomprehensible as the total of reality and
u uolcnowable. God is here beyond all realization and knowledge
and understanding. One can only assert of Him that He is the
All of nature, but otherwise nothing, absolutely nothing. For if
I say: He is All, fundamentally then I say as much and 115 little
u nothing. I do not know everything, do not know what that
All is. This skepticism of the possibility of knowing God is designated as negative theology. That means, nothing is known of God
but that He exisrs.
Thus we come to the final result. The natural sciences move
from a created nature to a nature without God, from a nature
without God to one without spirit and genius, from a nature without spirit to a nature without things and qualities. Together with
this tendency we see a picture of nature emerge which is the very
opposite: a nature that is God, a nature made up of things shot
through with spirituality, meaning, and plan. These two views
are in conflict with each other. But each of the two still maintains,
somehow, a relation to God: natural science in that it is selflimiting, which is an affirmation of the Unlimited, the Unending;
the nature of pantheism through its total spiritualization and total
affirmation of sensual temporality. Just as these two views of
nature fit together like bolt and nut, like plus and minus, just so
they have in their relation to God something in common: the
negativism of theology. Neither of the two can any longer definitely say what God is doing, as Moses can - fundamentally
neither says anything about God tha~ can be understood. (Pages
~8---40)
GENESIS

1:14-19

And God said, Let there be lights in the firmament of the
heaven to divide the day from the night; and let them be for
signs, and for seasons, and for days, and years; and let them be
for lights in the firmament of the heaven to give light upon the
earth.
And it was so.
And God made two great lights: the greater light tO rule the
day, and the lesser light t0 rule the night. He made the scan also.
And God set them in the firmament of the heaven tO give
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light upon the earth and to rule over the day and over the night
and to divide the light from the darkness; and God saw that it
was good.
And the evening and the morning were the fourth day.
ORIGIN OF ScIENCB

The work of the third day has essentially circumscribed the
whole of nature with the exception of man. The world has a rwofold content: the inorganic, the world of lifeless things; and the
organic, the world of living things. Both groups recur separately
on the fourth and fifth days. The fourth day concerns itself with
the celestial bodies, and on the fifth day follows the creation of
the animals. The celestial bodies concern us for the present.
Our eye, which had been occupied with the minutest products
of vegetation, is by way of tremendous contrast suddenly directed
upward and into the immeasurable world of space. The account
brings us face to face with a startling element which leads us
completely away from the presentation of the previous day's work.
It is the creation of the celestial bodies, nor just as such bur as
signs and as rimes [seasons] - the first concept of astronomy,
astto-nomy.
We could already feel time in the first three words of the account: "In the beginning." Time, in general, was already there;
the key for opening an understanding of the work of the fourth
day lies in the word sig,i, a reference to reality. What is seen
here is the first scientific concept which appears in the creation
account. TI1e celestial bodies do nor merely appear as such, bur
they are a sign for us who strive for knowledge, who seek to
know time. Equally important is that this knowing of time can
involve no less than mensuration, or measuring of rime through
the spatial, the celestial bodies. What appears here is nothing
less than applied mathematics, mathematical physics. At the same
time we have the assertion here that time can be measured only
by means of space. And the fact that astronomy is the infancy
of natural science -as far as we know- has given a determining
peculiarity to our science of nature. (Pp.45-46)
SclENCE IN FUNCflON

In his introductory remarks to the work of the fourth day
Weizslicker refers back to the antithetical nature of the created
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol29/iss1/33
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world. It is an innate tendency of man

to seek to overcome this
put back together where God has divided. \Ve seek
m overcome the two in favor of the 011e. This tendency has been
carried to the ultimate by science in that it seeks t0 explain away
multifariousness in nature and even seeks to explain away reality.
All this is, in final analysis, uni-forming, as was stated before.
Perhaps this is the time to say it. In our opinion this is the most
aitical thought which \Veizsacker expresses: man's attempt to
overcome antithesis. "God divided." Could it be that we would
take a more realistic stand if we bowed to this, if we simply affirmed the insurmountable contradictions and antitheses in nature
rather than attempted to make nonsense into sense by main force?
I.et us put this problem up to Kant is the suggestion. This is not
a good method; this is not a therapia magna, but it may get us
somewhere. Kant's answer can be stated in three words: knowledge
is synthesis. Synthesis is productive, leads somewhere. Analysis
does not extend knowledge, but it docs elucidate. Here, in this
real center of Kant's philosophy, knowledge is synthesis. Here we
have reached the very heart and core of modern science.

antithesis,

tO

Earlier it was stated that the moment the thought "God created"

was put inro words it became problematic. A problem creates
tension. With every assertion of the account the tension increases.
We may call this the tension between mind and matter, or perhaps
better, between nature and spirit and intellect. This tension cannot
be resolved; we meet it again and again. The final multiplicity
must be overcome by knowledge. .Knowledge is meeting of nature
and spirit. It is the conquest of that which is concrete to the senses
through thought. To bring these two worlds rogether calls for
a stroke of genius. Mathematics is jwt that. Mathematics furnishes
the symbols by means of which thought can lay hold of the
concrete. These symbols are numbers. We shall pass by the philosophy of this process and simply assert that by means of numbers
the chasm between the intellectual and the concrete has been
bridged. If we let our eye sweep the skies and then think of unending and illimitable space, we may wonder what mathematics
will do here. Can it also master this? But unending space is no
obstacle. With calculw the mathematician can master also this.
Mathematics is an instrument of thought fully adaptable to all the
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vagaries of any science. It .is this synthesis which gives science
such power and such potentiality.
THE SYNTHESIS OP SclENCE

Thus Weizslicker explains why mathematics is the real foundation of physics. "Thus the mathematical picture of nature was
developed by physics. It is a picture because it .is a sign, a symbol
by means of which thought can point to the concrete and represent it." Many will look upon this picture as the real thing, just
as one might show a portrait of himself saying, "This is I." "The
concrete itself cannot be apprehended by thought, but only that
which symbolizes or represents the concrete. These symbols are
the mathematical laws of nature. These laws themselves have
no reality, but nature obeys them without fail and necessarily."
This relation of obedience between nature and her laws, with
which we all are acquainted, was not alien to the Biblical author,
as he described the fourth day of creation; it simply had to flow
from his pen at the moment in which this scientific thought first
flashed in his mind. Very explicitly he says- expressing the passive obedience actively- "the greater light to rule the day." What
irony! At the first, the Creator Himself appoints the sun to rule
the day and thus also establishes science. However, science becomes Lucifer. From century to century it becomes more powerful
and independent. We have already seen this development of the
sciences - there is something compelling about science. This compelling element is the truth of experience.
We shall return to a thought which had been dropped for the
time being in the discussion of the third day. There we said that
manifold qualities in nature are being overcome. Now, with mathematics on the scene, we can observe how these m:mifold qualities
nre dealt with by a qualifying science.
RESULTS OP SYNTHESIS

We hinted earlier that this process of dequalifying is essentially
a synthesis. "At first it would seem that the number of qualities
is built up, at all events. Chemistry has, for example, an endless
list of elements and compounds which are distinguished by color,
consistency, weight, valence, etc. Quantitative science sorts out and
eliminares more and more of these qualities until at the end of this
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol29/iss1/33
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process only a few conccptS remain, such as energy, matter, motion,
space, time, causality." These are physical fundamentals. "What
is the principle of elimination? What decides whether or not
a concept is physically fundamental or not? The answer is whether
it has objective or only subjective significance. The criterion is
whether a given phenomenon is 0111sid• or ,r11i1hin us. If it is
within, it can evidently not be physically real, but only subjective.
Red and blue, for example, are only sensations, but do not exist
outside of me in space. There they are only wave lengths of 400
or 500."
A rapid view of the history of physics will show that it has
been engaged in a persistent transformation of objective phenomena
ro subjective imagery. Color has alre3dy been mentioned. There
is no sound in space. Out there is eternal silence, endless night:
only motion of the masses, restless surging of matter. As we attempt to render the picture of nature as it is viewed by physics,
we are compelled to affirm the very phenomena it would explain
away. What is silence but the antithesis of sound, and night but
the opposite of light? Matter, too, is disappearing. It is only an
illusion of the senses. Physics is being transformed more and more
into mathematics of motion. Such matter has left only two irreducible basic qualities, expanse and motion, and in motion a hint
of a third- indispensable time. The concept of substance has been
completely replaced by the concept of function.
DISAPPEARANCE OF OBJECTIVE REALITY

Even the last two qualities, space and time, have all but disappeared. This is all that is left on which the concreteness of
physia restS so that we can somehow, at least, form a picture of it.
This is a fundamental problem of the present day. Our threedimensional Euclidian space, and our time, which is measured by
this space, no longer possess the unquestioned reality in the mind
of the modern physicist which had been ascribed to it since Euclid's
time. Our units of measurement ( which are the presupposition for
the assertion that two bodies have the same size, or that two bars
of steel have the same length) stretch and shrink and under certain conditions disappear altogether. The theory of relativity has
resolved objective space and time.
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1958

21

Concordia Theological Monthly, Vol. 29 [1958], Art. 33
442

A REVIEW OP VON WEIZSACKEll'S AM ANPANG

"We feel that this last phase of physics is the logical end result
of a process that began with a nature without God, which was
followed with a nature without spirit, which was followed by
a nature without things, and finally a fourth nature without any
concreteness appears, a nature that is unobjectifiable. This nonEuclidian space of modem physics cannot be sensibly visualized
(is, nicht mehr sinnlich anscha11bar). We can think this space, can
construct and operate with it mathematically, but we cannot perceive it with our senses" or picture it in our minds.
With the development of nuclear research, scientific thinking
has become more and more transcendent and moves in a realm
that lies beyond the powers of human imagination, and concerns
itself with that which is no longer objectifiable. Eddingwn, the
great English astronomer and physicist, touches upon this problem
when he explains the function of mathematical symbols. He also
makes frequent reference to this problem in his work The N111t1re
of the Physical l'f/orld.1 This same problem was discussed by Paul
Freiherr von Handel at the University of Munich in 1946.
In a general way, the present situation is characterized by the
strange discovery that in all of modern physics we are daily and
constantly employing concepts which are fundamentally incomprehensible, incomprehensible in the sense that they are not objectifiable, not real But this does not keep us from arriving at
concrete, in fact, very drastic consequences with the results of
our physical experiments. . . . In the space-time, four-dimensional
continuum it becomes apparent that the movement of a body
with the speed of light is characterized by the circumstance that
its spatial measurement shrivels to zero and its mass becomes infinitely great . . . the end result of the quantum theory forces us
t0 question the objectifiability of the things outside of us.8
CoNCLUSION

We shall forgo a discussion of the analysis of sensation and the
physiology of the sense organs and all the related problems, which,
to a certain extent, are attempts to justify the modern subjective
point of view. "It is a confusing and disconcerting picture" which
7 New York: Macmillan, 1929.
I "Phpik uad Brkeaataisrhcorie," Z•itwnd•, XVIII (26, 1946/47), 399
IIO 414.
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science conjures up, "in which the 'real' world becomes a thought
and the familiar world of our senses becomes an illusion." 0
Weizsacker sums up some of the final conclusions by asking
a few significant questions:

If the sNbj11c1
measure
is the
of things, does not the object become imperceptible; is not that which I perceive only my imagery;
the world of science only a world of fancy? True. That is how
it is. Arc not these mental pictures of mine merely symbols of
something which is incomprehensible? Yes, that, too, is true.
Is not, then, the mathematical structure of physics only a work
of an, something artistic; a fabrication? This, too, is true. Has
not science, then, become the sister of poetry, which also eng:ages
in anistry? This cannot be denied. Did not science set out to be
knowledge, that is, did she not seek to gmsp reality, absolutely
:and without limir:arions, and is it not a fact that science is only
a stage which represents the world, but is nor the world? Yes,
this, too, follows. Docs science actually stand higher than faithor does she, perh:aps, stand lower in the end? This is open to
question. Is the form into which science has been cast indispensable, or could there be, in the end, another form equally true or
just as untrue? Is science not merely one of the many w:ays of
expressing th:at which could also be stated otherwise? (Pages
5~54)
We conclude this with a brief statement from Uexkiill.
Finally I should like to point our briefly ... that the revision
of our picture of reality has :an extremely great and pracric:al
significance. In fact, how m:an pictures to himself the reality in
which he lives and operates has always been a determining factor
u to what he desires and plans. What man daies, or what may
cause him t0 shrink back with fear, in the end, depends on wh:at
he considers t0 be real and what he does not consider to be real
And today, somehow or other, we have a presentiment that our
picruie of reality is false and that on the basis of a wrong picture
of ieality we act wrong. How otherwise could anyone explain
the ever-incieasing and hopeless confusion which man with all
his planning and deliberate calculations has achieved in this
world? 10
Milwaukee, Wis.
• Wolfgang P. Pauli, Tn Wo,ltl of Lil• (Cambridge: The lUvenide Prcu.
1949), p. 4.

10

Uexkiill, p. 12.
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